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Count on SAE International®—the global leader in technical learning for mobility professionals—to deliver emerging research, consumer metrics, regulatory standards and the latest innovations to advance mobility at the WCX World Congress event.

COMVEC™ conference is the only North American event that addresses vehicles and equipment spanning on-highway, off-highway, agricultural, construction, industrial, military, and mining sectors.

Annual conference government policy, regulatory makers, automotive industry neutral forum discuss US government regulation, technology, customer acceptance future vehicle design. industry event safety, emission control, fuel efficiency, automated vehicles.

Join other young professionals in the mobility industry at the COMVEC™ meeting.

If you are not able to attend WCX 2022 in-person, you will have the opportunity to join a selected number of live technical and executive discussions online that will advance your skill set in propulsion, connectivity security and safety as well as the business of technology.

If you are not able to attend WCX 2022 in-person, you will have the opportunity to join a selected number of live technical and executive discussions online that will advance your skill set in propulsion, connectivity security and safety as well as the business of technology.

Wilfried Achenbach, who is serving as chairman of the SAE 2016 Commercial Vehicle Engineering Congress, discusses a range of significant technology issues including automated driving, Phase 2 GHG regs, the Industrial Internet of Things, cybersecurity and plans for the SuperTruck.

This paper analyzed information security challenges faced by Intelligent and connected vehicles (ICV), summarized the automotive information security technology standards and regulations developed by leading automotive industrial counties and international organizations, such as UN/WP.29 and ISO/TC22, and discussed the significant and necessity of the research work on ICV information security standard system in China. Focus on driving security, the paper also proposed the basic principles, logics and a systematic frame for building automotive information security standard system, and elaborated the contents and categories of the information security standards in the system. From whole perspective, suggestions for standard system construction and related research plan were proposed.

This paper deals with an integrated motor-transmission (IMT) speed tracking control of the connected vehicle when there are controller area network (CAN)-induced delays and denial of service (DOS)-induced delays. A connected vehicle equipped with an IMT system may be attacked through the external network. Therefore, there are two delays on the CAN of the connected vehicle, which are CAN-induced and cyber-attack delays. A DOS attack generates huge delays in CAN and even makes the control system invalid. To address this problem, a robust dynamic output-feedback controller of the IMT speed tracking system considering event-triggered detectors resisting CAN-induced delays and DOS-induced delays is designed. The event-triggered detector is used to reduce the CAN-induced network congestion with appropriate event trigger conditions on the controller input and output channels. CAN-induced delays and DOS-induced delays are modeled by polytopic inclusions using the Taylor series expansion.

SAE is developing a number of standards, including the SAE J2945/x and SAE J3161/x series, that specify a set of applications using message sets from the SAE J2735 data dictionary. (“Application” is used here to mean “a collection of activities including interactions between different entities in the service of a collection of related goals and associated with a given IEEE Provider Service Identifier (PSID)”). Authenticity and integrity of the communications for these applications are ensured using digital signatures and IEEE 1609.2 digital certificates, which also indicate the permissions of the senders using Provider Service Identifiers (PSIDs) and Service Specific Permissions (SSPs). The PSID is a globally unique identifier associated with an application specification that unambiguously describes how to build interoperable instances of that application.

With the introduction of Connected Vehicles, it is possible to extend the limited horizon of vehicles on the road by collective perceptions, where vehicles periodically share their information with other vehicles and servers using cloud. Nevertheless, by the time the connected vehicle spread expands, it is critical to understand the validation techniques which can be used to ensure a flawless transfer of data and connectivity. Connected vehicles are mainly characterized by the smartphone application which is provided to the end customers to access the connectivity features in the vehicle. The end result which is delivered to the customer is through the integrated telematics unit in the vehicle which communicates through a communication layer with the cloud platform. The cloud server in turn interacts with the final application layer of the mobile application given to the customer.

Driven by the growing internet and remote connectivity of automobiles, combined with the emerging trend to automated driving, the importance of security for automotive systems is massively increasing. Although cyber security is a common part of daily routines in the traditional IT domain, necessary security mechanisms are not yet widely applied in the vehicles. At first glance, this may not appear to be a problem as there are lots of solutions from other domains, which potentially could be re-used. But substantial differences compared to an automotive environment have to be taken into account, drastically reducing the possibilities for simple reuse. Our contribution is to address automotive electronics engineers who are confronted with security requirements. Therefore, it will firstly provide some basic knowledge about IT security and subsequently present a selection of automotive specific security use cases.

The ever-increasing complexity and connectivity of driver assist functions pose challenges for both Functional Safety and Cyber Security. Several of these challenges arise not only due to the new functionalities themselves but due to numerous interdependencies between safety and security. Safety and security goals can conflict, safety mechanisms might be intentionally triggered by attackers to impact functionality negatively, or mechanisms can compete for limited resources like processing power or memory to name just some conflict potentials. But there is also the potential for synergies, both in the implementation as well as during the development. For example, both disciplines require mechanisms to check data integrity, are concerned with freedom from interference and require architecture based analyses. So far there is no consensus in the industry on how to best deal with these interdependencies in automotive development projects.

This course provides an overview of state-of-the-art intelligent vehicles, presents a systematic framework for intelligent technologies and vehicle-level architecture, and introduces testing methodologies to evaluate individual and integrated intelligent functions. Considering the increasing demand for vehicle intelligence, it is critical to gain an understanding of the growing variety of intelligent vehicle technologies and how they must function together effectively as a system.

Abstract Connected vehicle technology consisting of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication falls under the umbrella of V2X, or Vehicle-to-Everything, communication. This enables vehicles and infrastructure to exchange safety-related information to enable smarter, safer roads. If driver alerts are raised or automated action is taken as a result of these messages, it is critical that messages are trustworthy and reliable. To this end, the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) and Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) Credential Management System (CCMS) have been proposed to enable authentication and authorization of V2X messages without compromising individual user privacy. This is accomplished by issuing each vehicle a large set of “pseudonyms,” unrelated to any real-world identity. During operation, the vehicle periodically switches pseudonyms, thereby changing its identity to others in the network.

Abstract ICVs are expected to make the transportation safer, cleaner, and more comfortable in the near future. However, the trend of connectivity has greatly increased the attack surfaces of vehicles, which makes in-vehicle networks more vulnerable to cyberattacks which then causes serious security and safety issues. In this article, we therefore systematically analyzed cyberattacks and corresponding countermeasures for in-vehicle networks of intelligent and connected vehicles (ICVs). Firstly, we analyzed the security risk of ICVs and proposed an in-vehicle network model from a hierarchical point of view. Then, we discussed possible cyberattacks at each layer of proposed network model.